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POSSESSION OF CANNABIS FOR MEDICINAL PURPOSES
IN R. v. Quayle [2005] EWCA Crim 1415, the Court of Appeal
heard a set of conjoined appeals and decided that a person who
possesses cannabis purely for medicinal purposes, even if it gives
him relief from the crippling eﬀects of an illness, has no defence to
the charge of possession. Duress of circumstances is unavailable,
and the conviction of the cannabis user is compatible with his right
to privacy under Article 8 ECHR.
It is hard to disagree with these rulings as a matter of legal
interpretation. Let us start with the elements of defence of duress
of circumstances. The defendant must be acting to prevent a threat
of death or serious bodily harm which cannot be met in another
way: R. v. Pommell [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 607. Admittedly, those
elements might be satisﬁed if his illness (in some cases, multiple
sclerosis) can amount to serious bodily harm, and if the medicines
prescribed by the patient’s doctor have already proven ineﬀectual.
But even if the person who takes the drug regularly is averting
an imminent threat of serious harm, the threat which he is meeting
is of an ongoing nature, and aﬀects many people. In the words of
the Court (at [57]), the defendants’ conduct ‘‘contravenes the
legislative policy and scheme on a continuing and regular basis’’
(emphasis added). So, for the ﬁrst time since Southwark LBC v.
Williams [1971] 2 All E.R. 175 (C.A.), a court seems to have given
recognition to the notion (more usually discussed in academic texts)
that the perceived emergency which bases a defence of duress of
circumstances (or ‘‘necessity’’, if one must) should be an emergency
of a likely ‘‘one-oﬀ’’ nature. Parliament must legislate to create
exceptions for ‘‘regular’’ cases where application of the law would
cause hardship. It is not enough, then, that there is nothing which
explicitly rules out the defence in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971:
any defence needs to be included in the statute.
The Article 8 argument was that the prosecution and conviction
of the drug user interferes with his private life, again assuming that
he derives some therapeutic beneﬁt from the drug. If that were so,
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perhaps the court would have to revise its self-imposed limitation
on the defence of duress of circumstances, as discussed above. But
that ‘‘interference’’ would be justiﬁed if it were necessary and
proportionate towards the protection of health: Article 8 (2)
ECHR. One can see why the Court accepted this. Recent research
commissioned by the government suggested that the dangers to
health from taking cannabis are indeed substantial and that the
potential medicinal eﬀects are normally relatively marginal. Thus, a
blanket ban on the possession of cannabis is not disproportionate—
or at least, so Parliament was entitled to conclude (note that it
matters only that the law can presently be defended: it does not
matter that the law might have been insuﬃciently thought through
back in 1971). Understandably, the Court of Appeal showed
substantial deference on the need to combat the harms of cannabis
by criminal prohibition.
Unfortunately none of the counsel in Quayle tried an even
bolder human rights argument based on Article 3 of the ECHR:
that the very act of prosecution would subject the patient to
inhuman or degrading treatment in so far as it would be likely to
inhibit him from resorting to his only cure for his illness in the
future. The right in Article 3 is absolute, so if it is engaged, the
State cannot justify interference by pointing to the same public
policy interests as might justify interference under Article 8. Thus
the problem of deference to the government’s assessment of the
risks to health from cannabis use would disappear too.
That, however, is the question—is the Article 3 right engaged?
The nearest analogy is with R. v. DPP, ex p. Pretty [2002] 1 A.C.
800 (H.L.) where it was thought that a refusal by the Director of
Public Prosecutions not to rule out the prosecution of Mr. Pretty
for any prospective act of assisted suicide he might commit did not
(on causal grounds) subject Mrs. Pretty to inhuman or degrading
treatment. It was her illness which did that, and not the eﬀects of
the DPP’s decision on the freedom of action of her husband.
It is a diﬃcult authority to distinguish, but one ought at least to
try. In Pretty, the illness (motor neurone disease) would necessarily
cause suﬀering and death. There is no cure available, short of
accelerated death (and the State is quite entitled not to recognise that
as a cure). But where a prohibited drug may restore a patient to at
least temporary health, then there may be a stronger link between a
decision to prosecute him for possession of the drug and the harm
which would then be caused by the untreated condition. Surely one
cannot say that the patient breaks the chain of causation by not
doing an act (the use of cannabis) which might alleviate his suﬀering
but which he expects would lead to further prosecution.
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So the argument in court could be that the prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion to proceed was an ‘‘unlawful act’’ under section 6 (1)
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (because it was incompatible with
Article 3); and that the court should terminate this continuing
‘‘unlawful act’’ by declaring the proceedings to be an abuse of
process. This bold contention should at least be arguable if it is
conﬁned to those (exceptional) cases where (1) no conventional
medicine has been eﬀective, (2) there is substantial evidence that
cannabis was helping the patient, and (3) the latter would not
continue to use the drug if he feared further prosecution. Note that
the accused would not necessarily be entitled to receive
compensation in subsequent civil proceedings if the decision to
prosecute were accepted to be an ‘‘unlawful act’’ (section 8 of the
HRA). Nor should there be any suggestion that the police
committed any ‘‘unlawful act’’ in arresting the drug user and in
otherwise investigating the circumstances of the case.
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